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The current inflation and recent fuel shortage have focused 
attention on the allocative effects of regul�·tOry policy. In particular, 
the Interstate Com1nerce Commission (ICC) has been criticized for 
inefficiencies arising under its control of entry, rates , and investm.ent. 
in the surface freight transportation industries, and alternative 
regulatory practices, emphasi?.:ing less agency control , have been 
suggested. The objective of this paper is t6 estimate the losses that 
arise in rail and truck transportation of �anufactured goods because 
the rate structure does not coincide with. the costs of providing service, 
The literature on costs and service of these modes will be examined 
and updated, and the magnitude of the loss will be developed from a 
reallocation of current rail-truck traffic in manufactures to the lower-
cost carrier. Finally, a more general approach to the evaluation of 
alternati•.re regulatory policies will be described. 
The three studies that will be considered here employ costing 
procedures and traffic allocation method's that are representative of 
the literature dealing with the effect of rate regulation on choice of 
mode. In the earliest and most comprehensive work, Meyer and his 
associates exa1nined transportation costs, market structures, and 
demand c.onditions in determining both an efficient modal distribution 
of fr.eight traffic and a regulatory policy conducive to such an optimum, 
1 
1. John Meyer, Merton Peck, John S.tenason, and Charles Zwick, 
The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries {Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 15-17. 
2 
In the process, motor carrier costs were computed from ICC formulas, 
and rail _costs were estimated from regr.essions of expense categories 
on output and size variables, In addition, the rail costs were adjusted 
upward for the inventory costs of the slower transit time and larger 
minimum load required for rail shipments. For the rail and motor 
carriage of high-value manufactured goods, Meyer found that the rail-
roads had "a narrow cost advantage at 100 miles, and a clear and 
i ncreasing cost advantage for traffic moving over 200 miles", while 
97 percent of large common carrier truck operations covered more 
than 100 miles, 2 In an article dealing exclusively with the efficiency 
of rate-regulated competition between rails and trucks, Harbeson com­
puted costs for both modes from ICC regional cost figures and adjusted 
them to account for the Meyer inventory costs and a deficiency in highway 
3 
. . 
user charges. Specifically , the average-weight rail manufactures 
shipment was compared with the corresponding average truck shipment 
at various distances. Using census figures on traffic distribution, the 
total of the losses from carriage by the higher-cost mode at each 
distance was found to lie between $1. 1 billion and $2. 9 billion per year 
depending on the regional cost scales employed. 4 Finally, in a review 
of the failures of freight transport regulation and the probable effects 
of alternative policies, Friedlaender developed costs for several ship­
ment sizes and determined the distances beY-ond which the railroads, 
with higher terminal and lower line-haul costs, were the more efficient 
carrier. 5 Again, ICC costs were modified by rail inventory charges 
2. Ibid., p. 194.
3. Robert Harbeson, �1Toward Better Resource Allocation in 
Transport," The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 12, no. 2 
(October 1969), pp. 321-338. 
4, Ibid1, p. 332. 
5, Ann Friedlaender, The Dilemma of Freight Transport Regula­
tion (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 42.. 
3 
and increased trucking user fees. A comparison of the estimated 
distances with modal distribution figures by size of shipment and 
length of haul revealed a misallocation in favor of motor carriers in 
all but the sznall-size, short-haul an_d large-size, long-haul traffic. 6 
These results can best be co1npared by basing them on common data 
and cost considerations. The results of such a compari'son will be 
reported after a review of the roots of the intermodal loss and an 
examination of the weaknesses of each study. 
Several types of inefficiency induced by regulatory policy may 
7 
be identified. lntramodal losses represent increased costs for a 
particular mode1s transportation services; empty backhauls and increased 
mileage caused by route and commodity restrictions on motor carriers 
are an example. Intermodal losses result from carriage by a higher­
cost mode. Welfare losses arise from pricing above marginal cost. 
Distortions in other sectors are caused by transport pricing policies; 
these are illustrated br the location of processing plants near markets 
and cities because of high rates on manufactured goods vis-a-vis· natural 
resource inputs. And productivity losses are the result of an overall 
negative impact on innovation in transport; the delay in the adoption of 
the unit tra,in and current restrictions on intermodal coordination may 
be cited. Only the intermodal loss arising from the divergence of rates 
and costs for motor and rail carriage of manufactured products will be 
studied here. 
6, Ibid,, p. 68. 
7. This classification follows Thomas Moore, 1'The Feasibility of
Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation, 11 in Almarin Phillips (ed.), 
Competition and Regulation, Brookings Institution (forthcoming). 
4 
The rate structure for regulated freight is based on both cost 
and demand considerations. Under value-of-service pricing, high-value 
manufactured goods are shipped under a relatively high ton-mile freight 
rate compared to low-value bulk commodities. This rate system developed 
as a railroad profit-maximizing strategy and a government policy for the 
deyelopment of the West. lt has since been supported by the ICC as a 
means of maintaining low rates on bulk commodities (agricultural and 
8 natural resource goods), 
Regulation in 1887 was directed against railroad price discri­
mination with respect to shippers and against the instability caused by 
railroad pricing and financial practices; it did not deal with discrimina­
tion by con1modities or with the basic problem of monopoly power, The 
railroads accepted regulation because it stabilized the rate structure 
while leaving value-of-service pricing intact, The existence of competing 
carriers and alternative suppliers and the importance of freight rates 
in market prices produced transportation demands that were inelastic 
for industrial goods and elastic for bulk con11nodities. Therefore, high 
rates on the former and lo\v rates on the latter \Vere more profitable 
than relatively uniform, cost-based rates. At the same ti1ne this rate
structure aided Western development. Lo\V rates on bulk exports 
increased the settlers1 market area, while high rates on manufactured 
imports speeded the development of Western industry. 
The efficacy of value- of-service pricing in meeting these 
goals depended crucially on the existence of excess capacity and the 
specified market conditions. Thus, railroad pressure for modification 
of the rate structure developed as rail traffic increased and then as 
increased carrier competition increased transport demand elasticities. 
Traffic growth brought abOut a decline in overcapacity that afforded the 
railroads the opportunity to reduce discrimination a1nong commodity 
8. Friedlaender, .EE.: cit.• p. 2.6,
rates. Also, an imbalance in cross-country movements caused a 
shortage of capacity for agricultural shipments that exerted upward 
pressure on bulk rates, But the ICC and Congress continued to hold 
, 
bulk rates down and reaffirm value·-of-service pricing in order to 
protect depressed agricultural areas. However, motor carrier 
competition began to draw the lucrative manufactures traffic from 
5 
the rails because trucking costs and rates were below regulated rail 
freight rates, even though rail costs were likely less than motor costs 
on all but very short hauls. Faced with both chaotic economic conditions 
in the trucking industry (due primarily to excess capacity) and the 
railroads* loss of revenue, the Congress regulated motor carriers in 
193 5  but did exempt agricultural comm.odities from rate regulation, 
Trucking rates became based on rail rates, as niuch a matter of 
expediency as anything else. Water transport came under limited 
regulation in 1940 despite the fact that water carriers forced the 
railroads to retain low rates on competitive bulk traffic. But competi­
tion by the lower-cost barges could have forced the rails off competitive 
routes or forced compensating rail bulk rate increases wherever barge 
competition was not effective. So value-of-service pricing has enabled 
the railroads to maintain low rates on agricultural and resource goods 
but required the regulation of both' the motor carriage that directly 
threatened the rails' profitable traffic in industrial products and the 
water cornpetition that indirectly jeopardized low rail rates on non­
competitive bulk. 
9 
Because the rate structure reflects demand condi�ions and 
noneconomic considerations10 as well as cost of service, some misal-
9. S.ee Friedlaender's essay for a more detailed exposition of the 
development of regulation and the apparent motivation for ICC policy 
decisions. � .  pp. 7-27.
10. Such factors include the provision of common carrier service 
on low�density routes and the maintenance' of c�r ·rier traffic shares, 
6 
location of traffic between railroads and motor carriers is likely to 
exist. It is usually argued that motor transport is overutilized because 
regulation has replaced price competition with service competition, 
but it is dangerous to generalize. Indeed, the history cited above 
suggests that some rail traffic may be protected by artificially high 
motor rates. Basically, the direction and magnihlde of the loss depend 
on the relationship between rates {which determine the current traffic 
distribution) and costs (which determine an efficient allocation) for 
both modes. The loss can be estimated by comparing transportation 
costs for both the current traffic distribution and a cost-based alloca­
tion. However, before this can be done, it is important to understand 
the costing and allocation procedures used here and in the various 
studies and to recognize the difficulties inherent in those procedures. 
The relevant carrier costs here are long-run marginal costs. 
While it may be argued that pricing of transport services ·would be 
based on fully-allocated or.long-run average cost under carrier competi­
tion (deregulation), marginal cost pricing leads to a more efficient 
allocation of resources (neglecting second.-best problems). Any deficit 
arising from the excess of average costs over marginal"costs, particularly . 
for the railroads, should be recouped from a lump-sum transfer r.ather 
than an arbitrary fixed distribution of the deficit over transport services. 
If it is determined that no practical regulatory mechanism {including the 
option of no agency control) would lead to marginal cost pricing then the 
intermodal losses develOped here would have to be refigured under the 
expected pricing norms. 
One of the problems in the estimation of transport costs for a 
hypothetical regulatory environment is that such costs have not been 
observed; this, however, could be handled by correcting the observed 
7 
costs for the effect of regulatory reform. In the case of complete 
deregulation, cost functions could be altered to account for the removal 
of roqte and corrunodity restrictions 
.
on motor carriage, the stimulus to 
managerial incentives of a competitive atmosphere, the removal of 
disincentives to adopt innovations, and so on. These are difficult 
adjustments to make and will not be attempted here. 
Both Harbeson and Friedlaender employed ICC figures in 
developing basic terminal and line-haul costs. In the current construe-
tion or rail freight service costs by the ICC, the variable expense or 
marginal cost per unit is determined for various categories of operating 
expense from a regression of the expense · On the relevant output variable. 
Both variables are deflated by miles of road as a carrier size. measure. 
These costs are then assigned or apportioned to the basic transportation 
services, e.g., line-haul and yard switching, and, on the basis of 
industry averages, are converted to terminal costs per carload and per 
ton and line-haul costs per car-mile and per net-ton-mile. 11 
Before 1970, the variable expenses were taken simply 
as a fixed percentage (derived in early studies) o� total operating expenses 
and returns on road and equipn1ent. The Meyer costing procedure, which 
is similar to t.he current ICC methods described above, therefore 
represented a significant departure v1hen it was published in 1959. 
But there Still exist differences between the ICC and Meyer costing 
procedures, the most important deal.ing with the specification of the 
11. Actually, the ICC has derived from historical data a percentage 
variable for the various expense categories \vhich is the quotient of 
marginal and average cost. For a given year, variable expenses are 
the product of the percent variable and the total of the expense category, 
and then marginal cost is the quotient of the variable expenses and the 
relevant output unit. Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of 
Accounts, Explanation of Rail cost Finding Procedures and Principles 
Relating to the Use of Costs (Washington, D. C., 1963), pp. 91.-94. 
cost function and the apportiorunent of common costs to freight and 
passenger service. These will be considered below. 
8 
Many of the ci;iticisms of transportation costing n1ethods 
concern the homogeneity of the output unit and the extensive aggrega­
tion and averaging of cost and operations figures.-12 These, however, 
have been directed toward the need to cost specific movements for rate­
making purposes and are less significant for the large-scale traffic 
allocation desired here. No
,netheless, certain weaknesses of the ICC 
costing procedure and Meyer1s regression methods are relevant here. 
The ICC uses a percent variable figure in deriving the variable portion 
of each expense category that may be expressed as the elasticity of 
costs with respect to output or as the quotient of marginal and average 
cost. 13 For the curvilinear relationship between deflated cost and 
output that the ICC estimates, both marginal and average cost and, 
12. For example, see George Wilson, Essays on Some Unsettled 
Questions in the Economics of Transportation (Bloomington: Indiana 
University, 1962). 
13. The ICC estimates: 
(f) =a+b(�)+c (�) '  H 
where: 
E =expense 
Q = output 
and the percent variable is given by: 
S = size measure (miles of road) 
E: = disturbance 
(b + zc(�))/(a/(�) +b + c(J)) 
where: ([\ 
S) = average output per mile of road 
Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Rail Carload 
Cost Scales by Territories for the Year 1970 (Washington, D. C., 1973), 
p. 172. 
therefore, percent variable, will be a function of output; so it is 
crucial that an appropriate level of output be employed. Gr.iliches 
has found that in 1958 the ICC produced an overall percent variable 
of 17. 6 percent by giving equal weight to the cost conditions of large 
and small firms alike; but consideration of the costs of the industry 
9 
as a whole (by giving equal weight to each ton-mile, i.e., by weighting 
individual carrier cost experience by ton-mil.es) yields a percent ' 
variable of 97. 4 percent. 
14 
The report of an aggregate percent variable 
for 1970 of 76 percent suggests that the over-representa -tion of small road 
conditions continues and that rail freight costs are underestimated. 15 
This averaging probem is not a factor in the Meyer procedure because 
the regressions are linear in the output variables and because the 
marginal cos-ts are used directly without conversion to a percent 
variable. 16 
The two approaches also involve different treatments of 
carrier size; the ICC deflates costs and outputs by miles of track, 
while Meyer includes a size measure as a separate independent variable. 
I n  Meyer1s formulation the object is to distinguish between costs vari­
able with plant size and costs representing nonoptimal resourc;e 
14 , Zvi Griliches, 11Railroad Cost Analysis, 11 The Bell Journal 
of Economics and Management Science, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring, 1972), 
p. 29. 
15. Friedlaender has pointed out that the greater degree of excess 
capacity in the larger roads (indicated in several studies) will lead to 
an overestimate of the long-run marginal cost in a linear cross-section 
reg ression. The effect in the curvilinear form estimated by the ICC is 
unclear. Friedlaender, op. cit,, p. 193. 
16. Meyer estimated: 
E = a+bQ+cS+e: 
where the variables are equivalent to those .in footnote 13. Meyer£!:_. 
al•, op. cit., p. 36, 
combinations at low levels of output. The ICC procedure extracts 
marginal costs but combines the size and threshold effects. Also, 
10 
Meyer1s specification includes the relevant size variable ?nly \vhere it 
is significant, while the ICC uses miles of road as the ·size measure in 
all the expense category regressions. Griliches has pointed out that the 
ICC formulation has no particular efficiency prof,erties17 and argued 
that the size variable is irrelevant. 18 The effect of these misspecifica­
tions on the estimates of marginal cost in the two approaches is not clear. 
Finally, the allocation of costs bet\veen freight and passenger 
service is treated in two different ways. The ICC assigns common costs 
in the same proportion as costs incurred solely by either service, while 
the Meyer procedure bases the separation on the variatio11 of costs with 
volumes of the services. The latter is accomplished by including a 
separate measures of freight and passenger output in the regression and 
is more reliable than the more arbitrary ICC asswnption. 
In all three studies, basic terminal and line-haul costs were 
adjusted for the value of the service differentials between rail and 
motor carriage. The longer transit time for rail shipment represents 
17. If the random error is assumed proportional to size, then defla­
tion can stablize the error Variance and improve estimator efficiency. 
For a linear form, the correct weighted least squares method mininlizes 
E a bQ 2-
l:(S -5 - s-l 
while the ICC procedure treats 
L:(E. - a s 
Griliches, .££• cit,, pp. 32-33. 
bQ 
2 
·s-)
18. However, Griliches based this conclusion on regressions of 
total firm cost on firm output (gross ton-miles) for alternative specifica­
tions of the influence of' size; but the size variable may be significant 
for some individual expense category regressions, Ibid. , p. 32. Barts 
and Keeler •have criticized the inclusion of the size variable on more 
theoretical grounds. See George Borts,"Statistical Cost Functions -
Discussion, 11 American Economic Review, vol. 48, no. 2 (May, 1958), 
pp. 235-238, and Theodore Keeler, 11Railroad Costs, Returns to Scale, 
and Excess Capacity, 11 Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 56, no. Z 
(May, 1974), pp. 201-208. 
11 
an inventory cost to the shipper relative to the trucking alternative. 
The time differential between rail and motor movements over particular 
dist'}nces may be developed from the different operating characteristics 
of the two modes and the cost of the rail delay evaluated on the basis 
'9 
of commodity value and a premium for interest, risk, and obsolescence, 
A second inventory effect arises because of the difference in miniqum 
loads required for the application of carload or truckload rates, cor­
responding to the different capacities of rail and truck transportation 
units, It is composed of a cost to rail users of holding and storing 
larger, inventories than truck shippers, less the decreased ordering 
20 cost of rail shipment of a given annual volume, The values of other 
19. The time differential may be approximated by: 
T = (;; - 3�.
t s) + ( 1 �;)+(�� (6) - �to (3)) + (�; ( 89 + 48 
where: T =time in hours, mr =rail miles, mt= truck miles, 
The first term represents the difference in average speeds of 20 mph 
for rails and 37.5 mph for trucks; the second allows for the rail time 
spent on sidings enroute; the third represents the difference in time 
required for interchange at dis�ances of 250 miles; the fourth is the 
rail time related to switching at intermediate terminals; and thE;:l last 
represents slower terminal handling at origin and destination. The 
cost of the difference in transit time is given by: 
Inventory cost (transit) = � x T 
where: C = commodity value, i = interest premium, H = 8760 hours per 
year. The parameters of the first .equation were taken from the more 
recent studies. For the basic formulation, see Meyer !:.l· al., op. cit,, 
pp. 19 2-193. 
20. This inventory cost may be approximated by: 
[Ci+ KJ (1 1 ) -zy- (Q r  - Qt) + S Qr - Qt 
where: C =commodity value, i =interest premium, K =annual 
storage cost, Y =annual shipment volume in tons, S =ordering charge, 
Qr, Qt= minimum economic load� for rails and trucks, respectively. 
The first term represents the working capital _and storage cost of the 
larger inventory required for the larger and less frequent rail ship­
ments; the second represents the additional ordering expense of the 
more frequent motor shipments. For the basic formulation, see Meyer 
et • .!!..-• op. cit., pp. 190-192. 
12 
service differentials (relating to dependability, equipment availability, 
loss and damage performance, and other service qualities) have not 
been developed adequately in the literature.2
1 
The superior perfor­
mance of motor carriers with respect to the service qualities mentioned 
suggests, however, that rail costs are somewhat understated relative 
to trucking costs. 
There is one other adjustment that can be made to account 
for service differences between the modes. While motor carriers 
normally provide complete pickup and delivery service on their through 
shipments, the railroads1 terminal service is limited to spotting freight 
cars on industrial sidings. Meyer has shown that the expense of 
maintaining and operating a private siding may exceed the cost of moto� 
pickup and delivery,22 so it is not unreasonable to include truck picku� 
and delivery expense as a cost of door-to-door rail carriage. 
Finally, a correction can be made for the deficiency in user­
charge payments by intercity motor carriers, a cost otherwise borne 
by the community. Meyer found a small deficiency for diesel vehicles 
but chose not to modify motor costs because of the relatively in:Signifi­
cant effect of user charges Gn total truck costs and because of the 
unreliability of the correction, Friedlaender and tfarbeson increased 
trucking costs on the basis of a highway cost allocation study by the 
Bureau of Public Roads in 1965 in which each class of vehicle was 
21. A figure for the value of these other services differentials 
is reported in a .:.�udy by the Charles River Associates (C.RA). The 
value is developed from ordinal rankings of the importance of various 
factors (including time in transit to which Meyer1s formula assigns a 
cost) to shippers replying to survey questions. The procedure of inter­
preting the rankings as particular cardinal measures of the monetary 
values of the factors and choosing a specific weighting for individual 
responses cannot, however, be justified. Charles River Associates, 
Inc., Competition Between Rail and Truck in Intercity Freight Trans­
portation (Cambridge, 196 9), pp. 30-33, 
22 . Meyer, op. cit. , p. 189. 
13 
assessed a proportional share in each of the highway cost increments 
for which it could be held responsible. The recommended increase in 
motor carrier fees was 1. 4 to 1. 8 cents per vehicle-mile, 23 
' 
At this point it is necessary to examine the means by which 
the costing procedures considered above have been used to evaluate 
the extent of the traffic misallocation between rails and trucks. In 
all three studies, rail and motor carrier costS determine an efficient 
allocation of transport resources that can be compared with the 
existing distribution. 
Harbeson developed costs for a weighted average truckload 
of manufactured goods of 16. 6 tons and a corresponding weighted average 
carload of 33. 7 tons at distances conforming to the mileage blocks used 
in c;,ensus figures on traffic distribution. Because no nationwide cost 
scale is reported for either mode, upper and lower limits were set on 
the expected cost differential by comparing first the highest regional 
motor cost scale and lo\vest regional rail cost scale and then the lowest 
motor scale and highest rail scale. With costs and traffic given at 
various distances for each mode, the savings of a shift to the lower­
cost carrier was computed. It is important to note that an exceSs of 
motor carrier costs over rail costs at any mileage does not imply a 
shift of all the relevant traffic. Instead, the cost differential is an 
average over all shipments so that there will exist specific commodity 
movements for ·which the cost advantage is reversed. 
The main difficulty here is one of interpretation. The implica­
tion of the problem formulation is that the relevant choice for the 
shipper is between a truck shipment of a certain size and a rail ship­
ment of approximately twice the size. certainly the choice of these 
weights is open to question, despite the fact that they are average 
23. Friedlaender, op. cit., p. 38. 
14 
loads; but more importantly the analysis requires a change in the 
scheduling and operations of the shipper. At this stage in the analysis 
of rate deregulation, it seems more appropriate to shift traffic to the 
low-cost mode without altering other shipper decisions, especially 
since the inventory effects of differences in service are not well 
formulated. This is the procedure adopted in the Friedlaender book. 
There unit costs were calculated for various shipment sizes. 
24 
Because rail terminal costs are high and rail line-haul costs low 
relative to motor carriers for every shipment size, it is possible 
to calculate distances beyond which railroads are the more efficient 
carrier. Friedlaender used these distances in conjunction with census 
data to indicate the types of shipment likely to be moved by the higher-, 
cost carrier. One of the problems, however, in n1aking a more detailed 
examination of potential traffic shifts is that the ICC costs are less 
reliable when extrapolated to atypical movements, e.g., very small 
or large shipment sizes. 
As described above, the Meyer study derives its rail cost 
estimates· from the regressions of the various expense accounts· on the 
relevant output and size vari.ables. The marginal output costs obtained 
from the regressions were then converted, if necessary, to unit ton­
mile costs on the basis of industry statisti_cs, e.g., yard diesel 
minutes per gross ton-mile. Motor carrier costs ·.vere derived from 
24 · Friedlaender seriously overestin1ated n1otor carrier line-· 
haul costs. In ef�.:;ct, she double-counted by calculating trucking line� 
haul cost from ICC reported figures for both line-haul cost per vehicle­
mile and per hundredweight-mile; these, ho\.vever, are regional averages 
calculated as the quotient of total variable line-haul cost and, first, 
vehicle-miles, and, then, hundredweight-n1iles. This error is implicit 
in the cost calculations. Friedlaender, op. cit., p. 39. The correct 
interpretatiGn of the costs is given in Interstate Commerce Commission, 
Bureau of Accounts, Simplified Procedure for Determining Cost of 
Handling Freight by Motor Carriers (Washington, D. C., 1968), p. 4. 
1 5  
an ICC regional study. Both sets of costs applied to average or 
typical shipments. With these costs Meyer determined the distances 
, 
for which each carrier was efficient'and compared this cost-based 
allocation with the actual traffic distribution, 
25 
It is useful to note 
that Meyer1s derivation and comparison of traffic allocations {as 
opposed to determination of costs) is similar to both Harbeson1s and 
Friedlaender's procedures. Meyer and Fiarbeson computed costs for 
average size shipments while Meyer and Friedlaender used modal costs 
to find the lengths of haul for which each mode was the lower-cost 
carrier. 
The details and results of an updating of the Harbeson and 
Friedlaender studies are given below. The Meyer work is excluded 
in what follows because not all the data required for a complete esti­
mation of costs has been published2
6
; the severity of this omission 
is, however, tempered by the fac_t that the method of evaluating the 
extent of the misallocation is represented in the two reported studies. 
All the results described in the next section must be viewed in the 
context of the difficulties and weaknesses involved in the costing ·and 
allocation procedures that appear in the literature. 
25, The CB.A researchers extended the Meyer cost estimates and 
used traffic data to develop explicit figures for the potential traffic 
shift and resulting reduction in system transport costs. The analysis, 
however was perfomed in a rather careless manner -- parameters 
conun.on to both inventory costs were updated in one but not the other 
and a simple calculation, from which a key result is obtained, appears 
to be incorrect. Charles River Associates, Inc,, op. cit. , pp. 20-29, 
45. 
26 . For example, yard diesel switching hours is required for 
Meyer's regressions of yard expense but is not published on a road­
by-r0ad basis for 1970-71. 
1 6  
The Harbeson and Friedlaender studies may be Compared by 
basing them on the same cost considerations and years of operation. 
In the revision that follows, basic terminal and line-haul expenses 
were obtained from ICC cost studies for 1970 
27 . and ad3usted to 
account for user charge deficiencies 
28 
and service differentials 
related to time in transit;9 minimum shipment sizes,30 and pickup 
27. Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Rail 
Carload Cost Scales by_ Territories for the Year 1970, pp. 114-134, and 
Interstate Cormnerce Commission, Bureau of Accounts, Cost of Trans­
porting Freight by Class I and Class II Motor Common Carriers of 
General Commodities by Regions or Territories for the Year 1970 
(Washington, D. C., 1972), pp. 25-193. 
2 8 . Motor carrier costs were increased 1. 8 cents per vehicle-mile. 
This figure was obtained by selecting 1. 6 cents per vehicle-mile {the 
midpoint of the range suggested by Friedlaender and cited in the text 
above) as the relevant figure for 1965 and adjusting it to 1 9 70 price 
levels with the wholesale price index for construction 1naterials and 
components. 
29. See footnote 19 for the forn1ulation of this inventory effect. 
The cost was evaluated for: . 
C = $1, 000 per ton; i = 15 % per annuni. 
The value figure was derived from census figures on comn1odity volumes 
and fro1n wholesale prices of individual commodities. The selection of 
representative goods for each census group reflected a bias toward over­
estimation of the average value. See U. S. Census Bureau, 1967 
Census of Transportation, Vol. Ill, Coni.modity Transportatio;-8urvey, 
Part 1, Shipper Groups (Washington, D. C. , 1970) and Interstate Com'."' 
merce Commission, Bureau of Transport Econo1nics and Statistics, 
Freight Revenue and Wholesale Value at Destination of Commodities 
Transported by Class I Line-haul Railroads (Washington, D. C., 1961). 
30. See footnote 20 for the formulation of this inventory effect. 
The cost was evaluated for: 
C = $1, 000 per ton; i = 15% per annum; K = $100 per ton per 
year; S = $10 per order; Y = 5,000 tons per year; Qr = -25. 6 
tons (Harbeson), 15-50 tons (Friedlaender); Qt = 12, 2 tons 
{Harbeson), 10 tons (Friedlaender). 
The result was a small net charge against motor carriers for all but 
largest rail shipments, and in the interest of overstating the case for 
motor carriers, no adjustment of basic costs was made. 
1 7  
3 1  
and delivery. Losses were determined b y  comparing cost-based 
allocations with traffic distribution figures by length of haul or by size 
32 
of shipment and length of haul for 1967. 
Harbeson1s procedure will be considered first. Costs were 
estimated for average loads of 12. 2 tons per vehicle for Cla.ss I inter-
33 
city common carriers and 25. 6 tons per car for Class I railroads .. 
Motor carrier costs assumed a single-line movement with no inter­
mediate transfer, while rail costs were based on shipment in a general 
service, unequipped boxcar in an average weight train, Costs were 
34 
calculated for distances corresponding to the census mileage blocks, 
The intermodal loss was determinl':d by evaluating the savings at each 
distance of reallocating all traffic to the lower-cost mode and then 
31 . Pickup and delivery costs for the Eastern-Central territory in 
1970 were used, with the assumption of a maximum motor carrier load 
of 30 tons. See text below for the importance of this assumption. 
32. Distribution fig.urea by length of haul and size of shipment were 
published only for the individual commodity classes, 
figures required here were prepared by the author. 
the Census, �· 
so the aggregate 
See U . S. Bureau of 
33. These figures were drawn from Interstate Commerce Com.mis -
sion, Transport Statistics in the United States, year ending Dec. 31,  
1970, Part 1,  Railroads, and Part 7,  Motor Carriers (Washington, D. C. 
1973). Although they represent averages for all commodity traffic, the 
figure fol:' motor carriers should be accurate because manufactures 
account for more than 80% of trucking tonnage. Railroads, however, 
carry a much larger proportion of . bulk commodities, so that the figure 
used is likely an overestimate of the average manufactures load. This 
error may be counteracted to a greater or lesser extent by the fact that 
the rail costs used apply to carload shipments and not all shipments. 
34 . An allowance for circuity was necessary because the census 
figures represent straight-line miles. Short-line or rate-making miles 
exceed Straight-line miles by 24o/o and 21% for rails and trucks, 
respectively and, on average, actual miles exceed rate-making miles 
by 16% and 6%. Therefore, census mileages were increased by 44% for 
railroads and 28% fol' motor carriers • 
sum.ming the individual components. The steps and results of this 
computation are shown in Figure 1 for the lowest regional motor 
carrier costs and highest regional rail costs and in Figure 2 for the 
35corresponding highest motor carrier and lo\vest rail cost scales. 
18 
Friedlaender's analysis required costs for several specific 
shipment si.zes. Motor carrier costs were based on weighted average 
single and interline movements in Eastern-Central territory and rail 
f . h 
36 . . h . . costs on average reig t car costs in an average weig t train in 
Official territory. 3 7  Following Friedlaendet no consolidation of small 
shipments was made, but her assumption of a 20-ton maximUIU load 
3 8  
for motor vehicles was revised t o  a 30-ton limit. Higher terminal 
costs and lower line-haul costs for rails relative to trucks at all ship­
ment sizes indicated a rail cost advantage at the longer distances. 
Therefore, the costs were used to determine the distance beyond which 
35. The lowest regional motor carrier costs were reported for the 
Southern (Intra) region for the first seven mileage blocks and the South­
west region for the remaining five; the highest rail costs appeared in 
the Mountain Pacific and Trans-territory for the first mileage block and 
in the New England region for all others. These costs were uSed in 
Figure 1. For Figure 2, the highest motor carrier costs were reported 
for the Transcontinental territory for the first five mileages and the 
New England region -- Group II for the remaining seven; the lowest rail 
cost appeared in the Southern region for a�l mileage blocks. 
36, Terminal and line-haul costs for a representative' freight car 
were obtained by weighting individual car costs by the proportions of the 
total in service in the Eastern.district at the close of 1970. 
37. The Eastern-Central motor carrier territory and Official r'ail 
territory encompass almost identical geographical areas, 
38. The weighted average capacity of all terminal-to-t'erminal 
vehicles in the Eastern-Central territory is approximately 20 tons; it 
was therefore assumed that 30-ton vehicles (at average commodity 
density) are available f6r these shipments. Interstate Commerce Com­
mission, Bureau of Accounts, Cost of Transporting Freight by Class I 
and Class II Motor Common Carriers of General Commodities, p. 22. 
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Figure l 
Minimum Motor Carrier Costs vs. Maximum Rail Costs 
{Harbeson, 1970) 
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Figure 2 
Maximum Motor Carrier Costs vs. Minim= Rail Costs 
(Harbeson, 1970) 
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39 
rail shipment is more efficient than motor carriage. The estimated 
distances identified an efficient allocation, and the modal distribution 
40 
figures1were used to determine the potential traffic shifts. Shipment 
cost components are sho\vn in Figure 3 and the calculated distances and 
resulting traffic shift in Figure 4. 
The results of the costing and allocation procedures for 197,0 
indicate that a substantial misallocation of traffic does exist and that a 
rationalization of the rate structure would lead to shifts in both directions 
and not predominantly toward rail transport, as other studies have sug-
gested. The losses developed in the Harbeson approach are relatively 
smaller than those reported for 1963, mainly because the early study 
did not include pickup and delivery expenses in rail costs. 
41 
For 1970,
the loss ranges from 31 percent to 5 percent of the current transportation 
cost of manufactured goods covered by the census figures, depending on 
the cost scales used in the cost comparison. The Friedlaender results 
suggest that an efficient allocation would require a net shift toward motor 
carriers. The computational errors in the original study preclude a 
meaningful comparison, but it is likely that the early results would 
indicate a greater railroad cost advantage than here because they fail to 
account for the.different circuities associated with the two modes, One of the 
39. Circuity adjustments were made by increasing line-haul costs 
by 44% and 28% for rails and trucks, respectively. The distances reported 
are straight-line mileages. 
40. Traffic shifts were based on an extrapolation of the traffic statistics 
that was linear with respect to both weight and distance, e. g., a distance 
of 260 miles required a shift from rails to trucks of 30% of the rail traffic 
in the 200-399 mileage block for the appropriate weight. 
41 . The total cost of current traffic may be calculated from the modal 
costs and traffic at each census mileage. The estimates of the loss 
relative to the original allocation '\Vere 40% and 13o/a.for 1963 and 3lo/o and 
5% foi' 1970; if pickup and delivery �xpenses are excluded from rail costs, 
the 1970 figures rise to 38% and 10%. 
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most striking results of the updated Friedlaender procedure is the 
increased motor carrier advantage as shipment size increases toward 
the vehicle limit -- the relative misallocations increase for rails and 
decrease for trucks as the 30-ton load is approached an<l then again as 
a second motor vehicle takes on larger loads, Finally, it is important 
to note that the shifts dictated by the Friedlaender methods do not contra­
dict the rail advantages found in the Harbeson approach, It is true that 
the Friedlaender procedure suggests a greater ·net shiJt toward rnotor 
carrier service than the Harbeson approach. The former method 
produced shifts of 32. 3 percent of rail traffic to motor carriers and 
23. 6 percent of truck traffic to railroads (Figure 4), while the latter 
produced corresponding shifts of 31. 4 and 41. 4 percent in one case 
(Figure 1) and 0 and 100 percent in the other (Figure 2). But, as 
described above, Friedlaender1s costs were based on identical rail 
and motor carrier loads, while Harbeson1s were developed for two 
different loads, corresponding to average shipment sizes. Employing 
a smaller truck load than rail load for costing purposes would, of course, 
increase the rail advantage. Thus, since the procedures are based on 
essentially the same data, the 
.
results are simply different views or 
representations of the same phenomena . 
The significance of these res ults for Policy decisior:i-s is restricted 
by several considerations, the most important of \vhich are the limitations 
of the analysis. 42 Some of the difficulties inherent in the ICC cost 
42. Other factors important here are the reliability of the data and 
the sensitivity of the results to vari<1.tions in model parameters or assump­
tions. Costing problems aside, even the census data were not correctly 
specified -- the traffic distribution figures represent only shipments by 
firms with more than twenty employees, and only a majority of the ship­
ments assigned to a particular commodity class need actually belong to 
that class. The distances calculated in the Friedlaender approach are 
very sensitive to the assumed maximum truck load and the magnitude of 
pickup and delivery costs added to basic rail costs. A maximum truck 
25 
procedures and in the evaluation of differential service costs have been 
outlined above. But implicit in the analysis is the requirement that the 
aggregate cost and output data reflect the competitive conditions pre-
' 
vailing in individual markets . With carriers operating at different points 
on the short- and long-run cost curves or on different cost curves, it is  
unlikely that the cost relationships estimated over a number of carriers 
will hold in particular markets for transportation .services. Indeed, it is 
not difficult to construct cost conditions and efficient freight allocations 
for individual markets that produce evidence of an overall misallocation 
under the techniques described above. However, the alternative of 
evaluating the existing misallocations at the market level and then aggregating 
is not practical because the data r equirements are pr ohibitive and because 
reallocations in any one market necessarily affect cost and demand condi­
tions in related or connected markets. 
It  should also be emphasized that this analysis is incomplete in 
several ways. First, observed marginal costs are unlikely to hold over 
significant shifts of traffic. Reiteration of the costing and reallocation 
procedures to an e quilibrium is required, or the cost functions (as 
opposed to particular observations of cost. and output combinations). can 
be used to minimize total transportation costs. In addition, the relevance 
of long-run marginal cost for pricing under deregulation of rates has not 
been e stablished; questions of market structure and strategy must first 
be res olved. Finally, the analysis is a partial equilibrium approach in 
the context of complete deregulation because there are several other 
considerations. The effect of the elasticity of demand for transport 
s e rvices must be weighed in reallocating traffic under a revised rate 
load of 20 tons would raise rail pickup and delivery expense and motor 
carrier terffiinal and line-haul cost for a 30-ton load, thereby reducing 
the estimated maximum distance for efficient motor carriage of the load 
from 894 miles to 97 miles. And limiting the rail increment for pickup 
and delivery to just the cost of loadin'g and unloading reduces the average 
distance for all loads to 200 miles. 
26 
structure. Other modes and commodity classes must be included. 
Losses other than the intermodal inefficiency must be estimated. And 
the dislocation or transition costs of the change must be set against ihe 
losses in a general equilibrium framework. Also, the effects of 
deregulation are likely to be interactive, e. g., liberalized licensing 
requirements for motor carriers and abandonment procedures for rail­
roads will affect the costs that determine an optimal allocation of traffic. 
Obviously a more comprehensive approach is required. 43 
An alternative procedure is to model the pricing and investment 
decisions that a carrier will make under various technological, market. 
and regulatory constraints. Absent regulation, the firm can be viewed 
as maximizing some objective function (e.g. , profits) with respect t o  
the rates i t  sets and the capital (r olling stock) i t  assigns to various 
transport markets. I-Ter e  the carrier is a multiproduct firm whose 
markets are defined by the movement of a commodity from one point 
to another. Production in these markets is characterized in part by the 
geographic connection of the markets and the j oint product nature of the 
round trip as the firm1s production unit. Regulation can be viewe� as a 
43. Another example of a 'partial equilibriu1n result with important 
policy implications is the ass ertation that '1{motor carrier) rates would 
fall 20 percent generally if regulation of trucking \Vere eli1ninated , 1 1 
Moore, �- , p. 6. Also see Friedlaender, op. cit. , p. 71. This
figure is drawn from the experience of deregulation of certain agri­
cultural comn1odities in the mid-1950s. Surveys by the Department of 
Agriculture found that rates fell a� average of 33 percent for fresh 
poultry, 36 percent for frozen poultry, and 19 percent fol:- frozen fruits ·  
and vegetables. If t:1e lower rates reflected the opportunities for pre­
viously unauthorized regulated and exempt carriers to obtain greater 
return loads, then it is  clear that the reduction cannot be extended to 
deregulation in all commodities. However, the USDA studies provide no 
direct evidence on this point. U. S.  Department of Agriculture, Inter­
state Trucking of Fresh and Frozen Poultry under Agricultural Exemption, 
Marketing R e s earch Report No. 224 (Washington, D. C. , 1958) and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Interstate _Trucking of Frozen Fruits and 
Vegetables under Agricultural Exemption, Marketing R e s earch Report 
No. 316 (Washington, D. C. , 1959). 
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set of constraints on the pricing (rates conforming to a value-of-service 
pricing structure) and investment (common carrier obligations in the 
face of ptochastic demand and entry or exit restrictions) policies of the 
carrier. 
This modeling approach is valuable because it can indicate the 
overall impact of regulatory change on the decisions of a carrier, giv,en 
the effect of the change on the external envirorunE:nt (transport demands 
and factor supplies). lt will also be useful in describing the impact of 
alternative regulatory policies in markets characterized by particular 
competitive and demand conditions, It is less clear that the model can 
be used to produce a more reliable estimate of aggregate loss than those 
obtained above; but at least it can identify the relevant variables in the 
evaluation of the cost of a certain regulation. In this regard, the proposed 
analysis can suggest which regulatory policies are effective constraints 
on the decisions of the firm; this has implications for the sequence in 
which regulation is revi.sed. Finally, this micro approach can provide 
insight into the interactions between regulatory constraints and firm 
decision-making, which by itself is sufficient reason for consideration. 44 
44. The formulation and evaluation of such a model is being unde_r­
taken as a portion of the dissertation research of the author. 
28 
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